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ABSTRACT 
The post-colonial period in many African countries was, and still is, marked by political 
breakdown, authoritarianism and war. African state institutions saw fragmentation, 
breakdown and in some cases, failure. For many Africanist scholars “state weakness” is a 
main cause for political violence. State weakness results from pre-colonial and colonial 
legacies which created authoritarian structures, supported the rise of autocratic political 
leaders and entrenched dysfunctional state practices. Dysfunctional state practices 
manifest themselves during civil wars when governments and national armies exploit and 
rape their civilian population, failing to provide security from rebel violence. This paper 
argues that dysfunctional state practices during civil war are enabled by a history of 
gender discourses and beliefs. In the wars of the Democratic Republic of Congo and in 
the Sierra Leonean war, when army soldiers abused and raped civilians, they were 
enabled by gendered hierarchies, norms and beliefs, which they employed to legitimize 
and normalize their actions.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
When civil wars take place, national armies are often the main perpetrators of 
rape and exploitation against civilian populations. In order to rationalize and normalize 
these violent practices, governments and armies employ norms of masculinity and 
femininity as a form of legitimation. The ongoing Congolese civil war and the Sierra 
Leonean civil war provide case study evidence of this pattern. Gender discourses and 
beliefs which constitute the norms of masculine and feminine gender identity are 
militarized in the context of war and form the basis for state actions. Gender is a causal 
factor for the widespread perpetuation of rape and exploitation by national armies for two 
main reasons. First, dysfunctional state practices and war-making are gendered practices. 
As argued in “The Gendered Subject of Violence in African Conflicts” by Maria 
Erikkson Baaz and Maria Stern, ‘armed conflict in Africa reflects and reproduces gender 
discourses and gendered subjects.’1 Second, gender is co-constitutive of all social 
institutions, including state institutions.
2
  
My main question for this research first began with a focus on gender and the 
state institutions. How were men and women included or excluded from the state? Many 
scholars argue that civil wars in Africa result from the marginalization of youth 
(primarily young men) who oppose the state’s exclusion and take to arms. A prominent 
scholar of Sierra Leone, Paul Richards for example, argues that the Revolutionary United 
                                                 
1
 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, “The Gendered Subject of Violence in African Conflicts,” in 
Routledge Handbook of African Security, ed. by James J. Hentz (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), 571. 
2
 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Relations 
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1990), 196-197. 
2 
 
Front (RUF) consisted of rural youth laborers in the farm and diamond industry who were 
exploited by village chiefs and frustrated with a marriage system which controlled 
women and “reproduced a clientelistic social order rooted in domestic slavery”. 3 
Moreover, the chieftaincy institution in Sierra Leone was a localized embodiment of the 
state, which was based on male patrimonial lineages
4
 and regularly extracted rents from 
its subjects.
5
 Alternatively, the RUF was a channel for an underclass of 
“lumpenproletariat6” male youth who resisted the ideology of state.7 In a similar vein, 
Preben Kaarlsholm
8
 argues that rebel groups in Congo’s eastern Kivus provinces fight 
against their ‘marginalization and exclusion’ from the state and the control of chieftaincy 
authority over land and people.
9
 
                                                 
3
 Paul Richards, “Young Men and Gender in War and Post-War Reconstruction: Some Comparative 
Findings from Liberia and Sierra Leone,” in The Other Half of Gender: Men’s Issues in Development, ed. 
Ian Bannon and Maria Correia  Bannon, Ian, and Maria C. Correia (Washington DC: World Bank 
Publications, 2006), 206. 
4
 Daron Acemoglu et al. “Indirect Rule and State Weakness in Africa: Sierra Leone in Comparative 
Perspective,” (Massachusetts: NBER Africa Project, 2013), 4. 
5
 Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
6
 Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana, “The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of The 
Lumpen Proletariat,” in African guerrillas, ed. Christopher S. Clapham, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 1998). 
7
 Antonios Alexandridis, "Neopatrimonial State and Lumpenproletariat: The Poetics of Ideology and 
Revolutionary Identity in Sierra Leone." (B.A. Thesis, University of Iceland, 2010), 3, 
http://skemman.is/stream/get/1946/4841/14413/1/thesis$00282$0029.pdf. 
8
 Preben Kaarsholm, Violence, Political Culture and Development in Africa (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), 
208. 
9
 Reinhart Kössler, “Informal Institutions in Africa: Economy, Polity, Tradition” review of Multi-Choice 
Policing in Africa, by Bruce Baker; Culture Troubles. Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning, by 
Patrick Chabal; Jean-Pascal Daloz; Relevance of African Traditional Institutions of Governance, by E. C. 
A.; Reconsidering Informality: Perspectives from Urban Africa, by Hansen Tranberg; Karen Vaa; Mariken 
Vaa; Informal Institutions: How Social Norms Help or Hinder Development, by Johannes Jütting. Afrika 
Spectrum 42, no. 3 (2007): 574-576. 
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If the state causes the outbreak of a civil war through gendered practices of 
marginalization and exclusion, how does it also enable the rape and abuse of civilians 
during civil war? 
I argue in this paper that gender beliefs and norms enable national armies to rape 
and exploit of civilians, and provide them arguments to rational those actions. Gender 
beliefs and norms structure state institutions by determining who can access and wield 
power, thus granting men and women differing access. Governments exclude women 
from political participation by masculinizing government roles and by upholding 
patriarchal beliefs about women’s inferiority. National armies use these beliefs to 
construct militarized masculine identity and empower soldiers to abuse civilians. During 
civil wars, gendered hierarchies of power and the beliefs that undergird them create the 
conditions for the rape and abuse of civilians. 
In her book Argument and Change (2002), Neta Crawford argues that ‘the 
institutionalization of behavioral norms is the extent to which routines and procedures 
that facilitate or constitute the performance of the behavioral norm are built into standard 
operating procedures and regulations’.10 Military training facilities the norm of 
militarized masculinity through the use of “woman” as an insult11, requiring both men 
and women soldiers to dissociate from any femininities within themselves. Therefore 
when soldiers rape women (and men), this anti-woman discourse which is embedded in 
                                                 
10
 Neta C. Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian 
Intervention (Edinburgh: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 91. 
11
 Joshua S. Goldstein, War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. (Edinburgh: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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the norm of militarized masculine identity provides soldiers with a basis for normalizing 
their action because it constitutes their socialized identity as soldiers.  
Finally, militarized masculine identity produces contradictions and frustrations 
within soldiers’ lives which gives an opportunity for soldiers to justify their abuse of the 
civilian population. As Baaz and Stern argue: 
Militarized masculinities (and the attendant promises and entitlements associated 
with inhabiting these masculinities) rarely resonate with soldiers’ sense of self, 
lived experiences or with the actual conditions of militarized men’s lives. These 
lived experiences are instead often characterized by the fears and traumas of 
combat, of betrayal and rejection and of failures to live up to the male provider 
role. The fragility and indeed impossibility of fulfilled militarized masculinity 
therefore requires continual concealment through military institutional practices, 
as well as through the individual expressions of such masculinity, including 
efforts to perform and regain power.
12
  
Definition of terms  
Gender 
Feminist scholars have contributed greatly to our understanding of what ‘gender’ 
is. Although gender is often conflated with the category of ‘women’, gender refers to the 
discourses and norms that define masculinity and femininity, and also to the social 
institution that ‘(1) defines the characteristics of groups; (2) persists over time and space; 
                                                 
12
 Baaz and Stern, "Why do soldiers rape?," 499. 
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(3) includes distinct social practices; (4) constrains and facilitates behavior/action; (5) 
includes expectations, rule/norms; (6) is constituted and reconstituted by embodied 
agents; (7) is internalized as identities and selves; (8) includes a legitimating ideology; 
(9) is contradictory, rife with conflict; (10) and is organized by and permeated with 
power.’13 This paper engages ‘gender’ as an area of research belonging to men and 
studies of masculinity, as well as to women and feminist studies.14  
Gender shapes identities, structures the material and cultural resources to which 
men and women have access, and distributes power and authority.
15
 In this regard, gender 
is an appropriate analytical tool to understand political power, institutional power and 
states. Abu Bakarr Bah has argued that in Sierra Leone, power is manifested in the 
political economy of everyday life. The civil war therefore represents the cumulative 
effect of destructive political and economic power, resulting in the abuse of civilians by 
combatants.
16
 However, gender differentiates men’s and women’s roles in the political 
economy, often empowering men and disempowering women.  
Political institutions are also gendered. According to Carol Cohn, institutions can 
be seen as gendered in a number of ways. First, institutions have a gendered division of 
labor within them. They also have built into them ‘presumptions about gender identities 
                                                 
13
 Barbara J Risman, “Gender as a Social Structure: Theory Wrestling with Activism” Gender and Society 
(2004): 431. 
14
 Judith Large, “The Restructuring of Masculinities as a Dynamic In War and Peace,” Peace Prints: South 
Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 3, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 3. 
15
 Carol Cohn, ed., Women and Wars: Contested Histories, Uncertain Futures, (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 2013), 3. 
16
 Ibid. 208 
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that shape the way they conceive their missions’17. Those presumptions about gender 
shape whether a person is perceived as sufficiently competent for a task’.18  The evidence 
from the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) shows that the DRC’s 
national army relies on beliefs about gender identity in order to justify their actions.19  
Furthermore, war-making is a gendered practice not because women are 
'naturally' vulnerable and men are ‘naturally’ violent’, 20  but because of historical, 
colonial, political and cultural factors differentiate men’s and women’s roles and 
vulnerabilities. Gender is informed hierarchical forms of power such as class, caste, race, 
ethnicity, age and sexuality. The intersections of these structures produce multiple 
masculinities and femininities
21
 which have the potential to become hegemonic. During 
war, militarized masculinity becomes hegemonic because ‘militarization becomes the 
defining principle that governs local level politics and the local economy’.22 
Militarization produces male and female identities that become defined by violence and 
aggression23 and override traditional gender constructions.
24
 
                                                 
17
 Cohn Carol, Women and Wars,15.  
18
 Ibid., 16. 
19
Jennifer G. Mathers, “Women and State Military Forces” in Women and Wars: Contested Histories, 
Uncertain Futures, ed. Carol Cohn (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013), 124. 
20
 Cohn, Women and Wars, 27. 
21
 Ibid., 5. 
22
 Angela Raven Roberts, “Women and the Political Economy of War” in Women and Wars: Contested 
Histories, Uncertain Futures, ed. Carol Cohn (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013), 49-50. 
23
 Ibid., 49. 
24
 Rosalind Shaw, “Experiments in Generational Time in Postwar Sierra Leone: In a Town where Youth 
Ruled Their Fathers” (lecture, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA, September 24, 2013). 
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Militarism and Militarized Masculinity 
‘No person, no community, no national movement can be militarized without 
changing the ways in which femininity and masculinity are brought to bear on daily life’ 
writes Cynthia Enloe in The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War.
25
  
Militarism forms the ideological background for the construction of militarized 
masculine identity. Militarism consists of a set of ideas and assumptions about the world. 
These includes a logic of masculinist protection from “outside” and “inside” threats, 
positioning soldiers or state leaders as protectors and placing the protected people 
(usually women and children in the traditional European imagination) in subordinate 
dependent positions.
26
 Within militarism, masculine identity becomes closely tied to 
weapons and belligerence. This process also requires the creation of a femininity that is 
defined by vulnerability and endurance.
27
  
Militarized masculinities are also created when national armies are linked to 
masculine prestige and honor. Concepts like “sacrifice for the nation” and heroism help 
to uphold militarized masculinity, as do sexist beliefs about the inability of women to 
fight “like men”. However whenever a woman does engage in combat or becomes a 
soldier, she is often labeled as ‘un-feminine’, as ‘masculinized’ and outside normative 
femininity. These discursive practices help neutralize threat of her presence to the 
essentialized bond between masculinity and arms.  
                                                 
25
 Cynthia Enloe, The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War, (Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1993), 20. 
26
 Iris Young, "The Logic of Masculinist Protection: Reflections on the Current Security State." Signs 29, 
no. 1 (2003): 16. 
27
 Enloe, The Morning After, 63. 
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In a war environment, militarization leads to the gradual encroachment of the 
military into the civilian arena
28
 because the state continually manages ‘low intensity 
conflict’ or relies on the national army as way to solve economic, social or political 
problems. 
Literature Review 
Theories of the State 
Studying the state and its practices has also meant studying its origins. Most state 
formation literature has concentrated on the development European state, arguing that 
‘strong’ states are the result of war-making and bureaucratic institutionalization. 
The classical definition of the state is given by Max Weber as - ‘a body which 
controls territory and exercises a monopoly on the use of force.’29 Weber adds that state 
institutions exercise power through impersonal, rational and standardized routines. 
Similarly Charles Tilly argues that the state monopolizes the use of force and has 
sovereignty
30
 - a result of war-making which centralized bureaucracies, bolstered taxation 
and created infrastructure and armies.
31
 Authors like Philip Gorksi
32
 and Julia Adams 
however, have criticized the centrality of war to state-making and have argued that elite 
                                                 
28
  Ibid. 
29
 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (Fortress Press, 1965). 
30
 Janice E Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates and Sovereigns, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1994). 
31
 Charles Tilley, et al., War Making and State Making As Organized Crime (Edinburgh: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). 
32
 Philip S. Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism, Confessionalism and the Growth of State 
Power in Early Modern Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
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politics and patriarchal family networks
33
 play a more influential role. On the other hand, 
authors like Bob Jessop
34
 argue that capitalist development is most important for state-
making. Philip Corrigans’ and Derek Sayer’ also consider capitalism and class formation 
as the most central aspect of state formation.
35
 
Scholars have also claimed that the “nature” of the state is to be a disciplinary 
force in society. Its logic of ‘law and prohibition’ transforms the body politic by creating 
subjects.
36
 Giorgio Agamben argues that the state’s forcible regulation of life (bio-power) 
accompanies its juridical and institutional powers.
37
 On the other hand, Krohn-Hansen 
and Knut Nustad argue that state cannot be reduced solely to its coercive powers. Its 
practices are an artefact of cultural practices which are constitutive of power. Similarly, 
many scholars have criticized the ‘concreteness’ of the state, arguing that it incorporates 
cultural and political discourses
38
 and ‘effects’.39 Philip Abrams rejects the idea of the 
state as a distinct social unit separated and “above” the social. According to him, 
although the “state-idea” is imagined and believed in different societies, it is located in a 
system of concrete practices.
40
 Thus scholars like him have focused on the everyday 
                                                 
33
 Julia Adams, The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe. 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005). 
34
 Bob Jessop, State theory: Putting the Capitalist State in its Place (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 1990). 
35
 Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution. 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1985). 
36
 Michel, Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Random House, 1977). 
37
 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer (California: Stanford University Press, 1998). 
38
 Carole Nagengast, "Violence, Terror, and the Crisis of the State." Annual Review of Anthropology 23, 
no. 1 (1994): 109-136. 
39
 Timothy Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics." American 
Political Science Review 85, no. 1 (1991): 77-96. 
40
Philip Abrams, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State,” Journal of Historical Sociology, no. 1 
(1988):47-77. 
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manifestations of the state, its contradictions, as well as the local and global forces that 
challenge its sovereignty.
41
  
Outside the European context, comparative studies of states and their histories 
have led to different theories of state formation. They have also challenged the idea of 
war as central to state-making, and argue that this is only true under narrow 
circumstances.
42
 For most of the Global South, states are a colonial legacy. Jean-Francois 
Bayart argues that postcolonial state is the result of colonialism and the political systems 
that existed before Western colonization.
43
 
Theories of African states have centered on the pre-colonial and colonial 
experience. Africanists scholars have focused on world systems explanations, on 
domestic and individualist causes and on economic and political institutions. Naomi 
Chazan categorizes these perspectives as: 1) modernization theory (which emerged in the 
1960s, arguing for the progressive development of African states toward ‘modern’ 
Western statehood), 2) dependency theory (which emerged in the 1970s and focused 
attention on imperial constraints) and 3) statism, which gained currency in the 1980s and 
focused on institutional mismanagement.
44
 
World systems explanations emphasize the legacy of colonialism, the external 
interventional by Western countries and the negative impact of the international political 
economy on African states. For example, the central thesis of Africanist scholar Walter 
                                                 
41
Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat, eds. States of imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the 
Postcolonial State (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001). 
42
 Tuong Vu. "Studying the State through State Formation," World Politics 62, no. 1 (2010): 148-175. 
43
Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly, (London: Longman, 1993). 
44
, Naomi Chazan, "The Diversity of African Politics: Trends and Approaches," in Politics and Society in 
Contemporary Africa, ed. Naomi Chazan (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 12. 
11 
 
Rodney in his groundbreaking work How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972) was that 
colonial exploitation of Africa by Europe caused Africa to be politically and 
economically underdeveloped. Colonialism’s impact on Africa led to deficits in capital, 
labor and productivity, as well as artificial borders.
45
 This laid the foundation for cycles 
of ethnic violence, military take-over and war. 
Colonial states were limited in infrastructure and were built to finance the 
metropole through the taxation of import-export industries at the coast, creating a 
dualistic economy
46
 with underdeveloped domestic markets dependent on commodity 
exports. Many scholars thus talked about Africa’s ‘resource curse’.47 Racial and gender 
discriminatory practices also created human capital underdevelopment. In the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and in Malawi for example, colonial inheritance and family laws 
banned women from owning property, taking out bank loans or starting a business. The 
colonial state also created power vacuums and internal competitions by empowering 
traditional authorities and politicizing ethnic cleavages.
48
 Richard Sklar argues that 
colonial rule in Africa had three basic patterns of power: autochthony, diffusion and 
despotism.
49
 Autochthonous forms of colonial rule adapted to indigenous political 
                                                 
45
 Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, “Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in 
Statehood,” World Politics 35, no. 1 (1982) :1-24 
46
 Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, “Why is Africa Poor?” Economic History of Developing 
Regions 25, no. 1 (June 2010): 21-50. 
47
 Indra De Soysa, “The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity or Paucity?" in Greed & 
grievance: Economic agendas in civil wars eds. Mats R.  Berdal, and David M. Malone  (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000). 
48
 Robert Bates, “Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa” Comparative Political 
Studies, no.4, (1974). 
49
 Richard L. Sklar, ed. African Politics in Post Imperial Times. (New Jersey: Africa World Press: 2002), 
192. 
12 
 
institutions (i.e. British indirect rule), rule by diffusion transferred European institutions 
to the colony (i.e. French direct rule) and despotic rule exercised violent control over 
Africans (e.g. Belgian Congo).
 50
 Perpetual violence in Congo, for example, has its 
origins in the institutional practices introduced under the despotic Belgian colonial rule.
51
 
Africa also comprises about 2% of all world trade and in many ways is still 
blocked from international capital and markets. In the late 1970s and 1980s for example, 
the United States competed aggressively for world capital to finance its growing trade 
and current account deficit. This had the effect of constricting the money supply, 
increasing interest rates and reversing the direction of global capital flows, thereby 
encouraging industrial imports. This disproportionately hurt African economies, as their 
economies did not feature cheap industrial producers, but forced them to compete in the 
international financial markets.
52
 Additionally, Africa’s dependence on international 
economic institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank have been included as part of the overwhelmingly negative impact of external 
constraints.
53
 U.S. Foreign policy during the Cold War is also seen as having a distinct 
role in destabilizing Africa. Among many instances where Africa’s dictators were 
installed and propped up by the U.S., the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the 
support of Mobutu’s disastrous 32-year dictatorship is viewed as a strong example of 
                                                 
50
 Ibid., 507. 
51
 Mahmood Mamdani, "The Invention of the Indigène." London Review of Books 33, no. 2 (2011): 31-33. 
52
Giovanni Arrighi, “The African Crisis: World Systemic and Regional Aspects,” New Left Review 15, 
May-June, 2002, http://newleftreview.org/II/15/giovanni-arrighi-the-african-crisis 
53
Trevor W. Parfitt, Stephen P. Riley, and Jeffrey Haynes, The African Debt Crisis. (London: Routledge 
1989) 
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American support leading to war and devastation in Africa.
54
 Other world powers such as 
the USSR, and former colonizing countries like Belgium, France and the United 
Kingdom displayed similar policies in that period.
55
  
Domestic and individualist explanations focus on bad governance and corruption 
in Africa, as well as the role of politicized ethnicity in bringing about internal war.
56
 
These explanations focus on the bad governing decisions made by African political 
leaders, and the unique ethnic heterogeneity that led to ethnic conflict in the post-colonial 
period.
57
 The efforts made by African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and 
Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea to centralize power and establish one-party states came 
with the personalization of power and a heavy reliance on bureaucratic structures.
58
 
Authoritarian political regimes were also achieved through coups and through military 
rule. 
Governments became authoritarian in the wake of the breakdown of a system of 
patronage and corruption. In Sierra Leone for example, after 1968 there was a rapid 
increase in the level of corruption, spreading throughout the administration, and headed 
by President Siaka Stevens’ clientelist networks. The patron-client system, in which 
                                                 
54
Adam Hochshild, “An Assassination’s Long Shadow,” New York Times, January, 17, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/opinion/17hochschild.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
55
 David Gibbs, "Secrecy and international relations." Journal of Peace Research 32, no. 2 (1995): 213-
228. 
56
 Robert Bates, "Ethnic Competition," 457-484. 
57
 James Habyariman et al. ed., Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action. (New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation, 2009). 
58
 Naomi Chazan, “The Diversity of African Politics: Trends and Approaches,” 7. 
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loyalty to the party or its leaders was rewarded by access to valued resources,
59
 began to 
breakdown the state structure, causing splintering within the government.  In the 1960s 
African governments also engaged in policies of extracting rents from their own 
economies. African governments interfered in the operation of the market by imposing 
artificially high exchange rates and high taxes on the export sector through the use of 
marketing boards. As Robert Bates argues, ‘governments were willing to undercut the 
interests of rural producers to promote the development of industry’.60 Urban workers put 
pressure on the government to keep food prices low by controlling agricultural inputs and 
using exchange rate appreciation and tariff policy to promote imports of food while 
discouraging agricultural exports.
61
 A focus on the leadership styles of ‘Big Men’ who 
generated patron-client relations has been linked to state breakdown.
62
 Africa’s inward-
looking trade policies, heavy government spending and overvalued exchanged rates
63
 
contributed to the socioeconomic tensions that led to conflict. 
Economic-institutionalist explanations focus on the juridical statehood of African 
countries – that is, its lack of developed institutions64 and the institution of 
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neopatrimonialism.
65
 For example, in Dead Aid (2009) Dambisa Moyo argues that the 
system of bilateral aid towards Africa has encouraged governments to be dysfunctional 
because they lose the incentive to provide public goods as they are not held accountable. 
They therefore create debt burdens, Dutch disease
66
 and encourage the political capture 
of the state’s resources. Lastly, although geographical and environment theories of 
African state dysfunction remain in the minority, Jared Diamond’s Guns Germs and Steel 
(1997) argues that climate, the late development of agriculture and diseases in Africa 
constrained the development of institutions. Africa’s climate explains why institutions 
developed at a later time. Jeffrey Herbst, in States and Power in Africa (2002) also takes 
a similar approach by arguing that environmental constraints and population 
demographics determine the extent to which Africa’s political institutions were 
centralized, thus determining its ‘strength’. 
A Gendered Critique of the State  
Although most state-formation theories do not account for gender, war-making 
and state-making are also gendered practices. Therefore the state institutions cannot be 
understood without looking at the gendered origins of the state. 
Mark Liddle’s “State, Masculinities and Law: Some Comments on Gender and 
English State-Formation," (1996) argues that gender discourses enabled English state 
formation. Liddle argues that state-formation involved a fundamental shift in the social 
                                                 
65
 Michael Bratton and Nicholas Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in 
Comparative Perspective (Edinburgh: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
66
 Raghuram G Rajan and Arvind Subramanian. "Aid, Dutch disease, and manufacturing growth." Journal 
of Development Economics 94, no.1 (2011): 106-118. 
16 
 
structure of gender and a politicization of masculinity which was achieved through the 
state’s legal and administrative apparatus, linking aristocratic masculinity to the practice 
of dueling and reinforcing a code of honor which was seen as useful for military protocol 
and the arts of war.
67
 English state formation in the nineteenth century was marked by the 
gradual erosion of aristocratic masculinities which had enjoyed dominance prior to the 
late medieval period and the development of bourgeois masculinities which became 
hegemonic during the nineteenth century. The politicization of masculinity was 
connected to the political economy, during which the industrialization and the expansion 
of the British Empire changed social relations among men and women.  
The competition between aristocratic masculinities and bourgeois masculinity was 
created by discourses of ‘rational-calculation’ emerging from capitalism and contrasting 
with the ‘warrior masculinity’ of feudalism.68 Thus the state was consolidated through the 
shift away from aristocratic masculinity though the ‘Cartesian masculinization of 
thought’ (the elevation of Reason) and gynophobia (manifested through witch hunts).  
If state-formation is a gendered process, then states institutions are gendered 
institutions.  Michael Schatzberg’s work Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa 
demonstrates this aspect. Schatzberg argues that in ‘middle Africa’ the political 
legitimacy of institutions, policies and procedures are determined by the normative 
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patriarchal idea that government stands in the same relationship to its citizens the way 
that a father does to his children,
69
 distributing rights and responsibilities accordingly.  
Schatzberg examines daily newspapers, popular literature, and political and 
church documents, pointing to the ways in which the paternal symbolic order is replicated 
at many levels through the state machinery and in segments of society.
70
 The ‘father-
chiefs’ of the state is seen as having the right to punish and correct those who have gone 
astray from expected behavior, but they must also accept limitations on the consumption 
of resources
71
 and not engage in gluttonous "eating". “Le pouvior se mange entire 
[Power is eaten whole]”, is a Congolese axiom which expresses the rights of the father-
chief to “eat well”, but also the understanding that power cannot be easily divided or 
shared.
72
  Women are instrumental to the production and preparation of food, but they are 
rarely portrayed as ‘eating’ in the sense of displaying power. This deepens their political 
invisibility and removes them from the relations of state power.
73
  
Thus femininity cannot be seen as separate from the masculinization of the state 
because subordinate femininities are construed as complementary to the paternal order. 
Schatzberg argues that ‘the mother’ is construed as complementary, but subordinate to 
‘the father’ who engages in de-politicized acts such as giving charity and maternal 
solitude to the sick and needy of the nation. Ultimately women are excluded from 
enjoying full rights and responsibilities of the polity, and are relegated to playing a 
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complementary role, especially since political succession focuses on the political father 
and his patrilineage.
74
 
Lastly, since the state institutions are gendered, the institutional practices of states 
are also gendered practices. Chris Dolan’s work “Collapsing masculinities and weak 
states – a case study of Northern Uganda” (2003) argues that hegemonic militarized 
masculinity allows men to exercise power over civilian men and women. This exercise of 
power contributes to a context of violence and war. Drawing on empirical from research 
in Northern Uganda, Dolan claims that weak states maintain a status quo of violence 
which destroys the possibility of developing alternative masculinities other than the 
hegemonic militarized one. Hegemonic militarized masculinity disempowers civilian 
men and creates incentives for armed forces to exercise violence on the civilian 
population in ways which actively undermine civilian men’s sense of self. This may 
contribute to the state’s sense of control over both civilians and army, both of which may 
be necessary for national and geo-strategic purposes. 
In northern Uganda pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial gender discourses 
have led to a normative model of militarized masculinity. Additionally ‘the legacy of 
ethno-centrist and racist discourses compounds the causes of suspicion and hostility at the 
group level and destroys self-esteem and self-respect at individual level.’75 The state 
denies the individual male the right to protect his own family (for example by refusing to 
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allow people to leave the protected villages and move back to their home areas) and fails 
to respond to civilian demands for protection
76
. As Dolan argues: 
The inability to behave according to cultural defined norms of 
masculinity, contributes to the [normalization] of violence in the context 
of war. The wider process of militarization (sustained by the international 
community’s efforts to ‘state-build’ via processes like Demobilization, 
Demilitarization and Reintegration (DDR) further creates a large 
economic disparity which favors the soldiers and disfavors the civilians.
77
  
Dolan theorizes that a weak state will actively reinforce a model of militarized 
masculinity as a political strategy in the absence of the mechanisms of legitimacy 
available to a stronger one.  
Gender therefore, is crucial for understanding states and their institutional 
practices. Gendered norms and discourses that masculinize the state’s institutions and 
construct militarized masculinities enable the states’ dysfunctional practices during civil 
wars.  
Origins of DRC’s Wars 
Although this paper focuses does not focus on the origins of the civil wars in the 
DRC and Sierra Leone, it is necessary to review the arguments that scholars have offered 
to explain their causes. In Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the 
Making of a Continental Catastrophe Gérard Prunier’s argues that Congo’s 1998 (which 
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involving Burundi, Uganda, Angola, and other states) was a long-term consequence of 
the Rwandan genocide. The war in Congo was structurally determined by the end of the 
Cold War, Mobutu’s death and the corruption of both regimes.  Thomas Turner78 also 
argues that that the wars in Congo were driven by the interests of Rwanda, Uganda and 
other countries. The first Congo War (1996-1997) was an invasion by Rwanda to defend 
its interests (to suppress the Hutu militia) and use rebel Leader Laurent Kabila to 
overthrow the Mobutu regime. The second Congo war (1998-2012) - which has been 
called ‘Africa’s World War’ - was a war to overthrow Kabila and exploit Congolese’s 
natural resources.
79
 David Renton, David Seddon and Leo Zeilig argue that Congo’s wars 
have been fueled by the capitalist exploitation of its economy.
80
 Western mining 
companies profit from the ongoing chaos and total deregulation of the mining industry.
81
 
William Reno
82
 has argued that Congo’s wars are a result of state failure and the 
transformation of the state into warlord system. Congo’s wars have also been also linked 
to the legacy colonialism. Adam Hochschild gives a historical account of the horrors of 
King Leopolds II”s rule and links the atrocities of the ongoing war to the brutality of his 
regime. Another historical perspective is presented by Georges Nzongola Ntalaja’s The 
Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History (2002). He focuses on Congolese 
resistance movements, and argues that the war represents a class-based revolutionary 
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resistance to authoritarian rule and pillage. Congo’s wars are part of Congo’s pro-
democratic social movements which date back to colonial times. Additionally, the 
importance of ‘narrativizing’ Congo is highlighted by Kevin Dunn,83  who points out that 
the ‘imaginings’ are relevant to understanding Congo’s authoritarian regimes. Discourses 
of barbarism and chaos that were upheld by Leopold’s and Mobutu’s regimes influenced 
the identity-making of political actors who took to war, ethnic violence and secessionism. 
Lastly, John Clark
84
 summarizes three of the dominant arguments concerning the origins 
of Congo’s wars: it is1) a product of state collapse, 2) a trend of world economic 
processes and 3) the foreign policies of intervening countries rooted in ‘greed and 
grievance’ – i.e. economic profit and political aims.  
Origins of Sierra Leone’s War 
Similar to the analysis of the role of Rwanda in the DRC, Lasana Gebrie
85
 claims 
that Sierra Leone’s war was an indirect invasion from Liberia. The RUF’s leader Foday 
Sankoh was trained in Liberia and received support from Charles Taylor. Furthermore, 
other authors have argued that motivations of ‘greed and grievance’ cause the state the 
Sierra Leonean civil war. John Hirsch argues that the origins of the war lie in Sierra 
Leone’s ethnic tensions between Mendes in the south and Temnes and Limbas in the 
north.
86
 These tensions were manipulated by politicians, contributing to the factionalism 
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of party politics and thus the state’s decline. Hirsch also argues that Sierra Leone’s 
diamonds were a major source of the conflict – those who benefited from the informal 
diamond market were also rival political actors within the Sierra Leone People’s Party 
(SLPP) and All People’s Congress (APC). Others have criticized this account, arguing 
that Sierra Leone’s war was not rooted in ethnic conflict87 neither were diamonds central 
to the start of the conflict. According to William Reno, the dual system established by 
British colonialism (i.e. indirect rule by paramount chiefs and a tributary system to pay 
miners in diamonds) led to a corrupt “shadow state” invested in the control and 
production of diamonds.
88
 Paul Richards claims that the RUF was created by educated 
youth who were marginalized wthiin a patrimonial state that was shrinking due to 
privatization, global recessions and the end of the Cold War.
 89
 Similarly, David Keen 
claims that the war was a result of social exclusion and powerlessness in a government 
that no longer had claim to legitimate channels of communication.
90
 Keen argues that the 
extreme violence committed against civilians was possible because blame was extended 
beyond politicians and there was opportunity for pillage. 
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Chapter Two: Methods 
Case Studies: Why Sierra Leone and DRC? 
The wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and in Sierra Leone draw 
attention because of their highly destructive consequences, leading the two countries at 
various points to be termed by scholars as ‘failed states’. More importantly, the wars 
were also gendered in terms of the extreme sexual violence employed through mass rapes 
against women and children (and men) by both state armies and non-state militias. In the 
DRC, the gendered negative politicization of ‘Rwandophones’ (denizens of Congo but 
native speakers of Kinyarwanda or Kirundi, whose ancestry lies in Rwanda or Burundi)
91
 
has been used to legitimize militia formation. However, the causes of civil war, their 
duration and their scope differ greatly for the DRC and Sierra Leone. The DRC’s sheer 
size, the number of wars, the highly complex ethnic, political and institutional history, as 
well as the fact that political violence continues in the eastern provinces today makes it 
quite different from Sierra Leone, a much smaller state with a less ethnically driven civil 
war which ended in 2002. This paper will look at the state practices in the Sierra Leonean 
civil war and in the DRC during the Kivus conflict (2004-present). It will not focus on 
the causes of the war but on the state’s use of gender discourses and norms to rationalize 
its abuses of the population. Finally, a significant similarity between the two countries is 
the presence of a globalized industry in alluvial mining, and the massive impact of 
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international actors in the country – in Sierra Leone, half of the national budget comes 
from development assistance provided by the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), the European Commission and the World Bank.
92
 In 
the DRC, peacekeepers, donors, non-governmental organizations, international financial 
institutions (IFIs), the UN mission and the International Committee in Support of the 
Transition (CIAT) have played a central role in its domestic affairs.
 93
 
Sources 
This research is primarily qualitative and based on secondary sources. I have 
utilized the work of anthropologists and political scientist in the field, who have done 
fieldwork in Kinshasa and in the Kivu’s conducting interviews in the Forces Armeés de 
la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC)
94
 or researching Congolese political 
culture
95
 and history. Similar ethnographic work has also been conducted concerning 
Sierra Leonean colonial history, Mende social institutions
96
 and the government-
sponsored paramilitaries named the Civil Defense Forces (CDF).  
By analyzing the history of gender discourses and beliefs, I show that states use 
them to exclude women from political space, to masculinize the state and to create 
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militarized masculinities. Militarized masculinity identity and patriarchal views of 
women’s subordination allow army soldiers to abuse civilians and rationalize those 
actions. 
Discourse analysis 
Colonial, Post-Colonial and Contemporary Gender Discourses 
It is important to regard current gender discourses in the DRC and Sierra Leone as 
part of a continuum of colonial, post-colonial and globalized contemporary discourses. 
Although primary pre-colonial sources on gender discourses, beliefs are available
97
 for 
the DRC and Sierra Leone, I find the collection of written and oral material to be more 
abstract and historically narrative than what can be meaningfully included the scope of 
this paper.  
Gender discourses and state practices in civil war 
African state militaries, in contradiction to their mandate to protect civilians, often 
perpetuate violence against them during civil wars. I argue that when states rape and 
abuse civilian populations, it is because they employ the norms of militarized 
masculinities and patriarchal beliefs about women’s subordination to rationalize and 
legitimize them. Gender beliefs and identities form the basis upon which soldiers act, and 
they are also used to legitimize masculinized, non-participatory structures of government. 
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These actions impact the civilian population in negative ways, and reinforce the actions 
of rebel militias along similar gendered lines. 
Rebel militias are incentivized to continue their violence due to these abusive 
practices of the state and its loss of legitimacy. Rebel groups have grounds to continue to 
war against the state, and can do so in the context of a globalized mining industry which 
creates resource rents through the supply chains of multinational mining companies.
98
 
Rebel groups in the DRC are connected to the alluvial mining industry of gold, coltan, 
tangtalum and other minerals which neighboring countries such as Rwanda and Uganda 
also exploit, and during the Sierra Leonean war the RUF exploited in the diamond 
industry for economic rents. 
Chapter Three: The Democratic Republic of Congo 
History of Conflict in DRC 
Under the control of Leopold II, King of the Belgians, the DRC was known as the 
Congo Free State and was brutally exploited - setting the stage for the inability of 
Congolese people to benefit from their natural resources. Since decolonization the DRC 
experienced a 32-year long U.S supported dictatorship under Mobutu Sese Seko and 
successive civil wars. These wars include the civil war of 1996–1999, the Congo Crisis 
after independence (1960–1966), and the first Congo War (1996–1997) which led to the 
overthrow of Mobutu by Laurent-Désiré Kabila and his rebels and the Second Congo 
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War (1998–2003) – also known as “Africa’s World War” - which involved nine nations 
and led to ongoing low-level warfare such as the Ituri conflict (1999–2007) the  Kivus 
conflict (2004–present) and the M23 rebellion (2012–2013). When Mobutu’s reign came 
to an end, much hope was placed in Laurent Kabila’s leadership; however Rwanda, 
Uganda, Angola and Burundi, who had been Kabila’s major allies turned against him.99 
Four million people died in the four year period of the Second Congo War from August 
1998 to July 2003 –the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II.  Today there are up 
to 6 million deaths that have resulted from the wars and their aftermath. The conflicts 
have also been fueled by the mining industry and the trafficking of illegal arms, and the 
DRC has been called the “rape capital of the world” by international news media due to 
the prevalence of the mass rapes (up to 1,000 rapes) of women, children and men per day.  
More recent violence has been concentrated in eastern Congo, which includes the 
provinces of North and South Kivu, Katanga, Orientale and Bandundu. The most prolific 
conflicts include the Ituri conflict (located in the Northeast Bandundu province) and the 
Kivus conflict, which both feature politicized ethnic tensions. The numbers of militias 
involved in these conflicts are numerous. These include a Hutu military group (FDLR) -
made up of former Interahamwe forces from Rwanda’s 1994 genocide and new 
combatants recruited after 1997, Congo’s own national army (FARDC), Tutsi rebel 
forces, Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), proxy militias of the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army and Ugandan People’s Defense Forces and more recently, General 
Nkunda’s CNDP and the Mai-Mai. Baaz and Stern argue that “the State Armed Forces 
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themselves (FARDC) are largely responsible for the violent climate in the Congo, as they 
have engaged in harassment of the civilian population, in addition to military clashes with 
the militia groups.”100 During the time of ‘’transition’—the time between the signing of 
the Peace Accord in July 2003 and the parliamentary and presidential elections held in 
2006, the transitional government embarked on the process of DDR – reintegrating rebels 
into the national army.  
Colonial, Post-Colonial and Contemporary Gender Discourses in DR 
Congo 
Belgium was preoccupied with changing gender relations and beliefs in the 
Congo Free State to fit a conservative Judeo-Christian model. The Belgians advocated 
and attempted to institute a model of the nuclear family in which pious Christian women 
fulfilled the roles of wife and mother.
101
 This was largely achieved through Catholic 
missionaries, colonial education programs and anti-polygyny laws. Belgium, from its 
inception in the early 1830s, was a repository of conservative European thought.
102
 Since 
concubinage and polygyny was widespread in the Congo,
103
 Belgian colonialists and 
missionaries sought to eradicate this by aggressively introducing Christian patriarchal 
beliefs, and policies were enacted to promote Belgian concepts of masculine and 
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feminine spheres - of men belonging in the fields, the shop, the pulpit, and the 
marketplace, and women belonging in the home as good Christian wives and mothers. 
Single-sex schools were also legislated, and educational attainment for girls was 
restricted through the curriculum and through limitations on the use of a European 
language for instruction.
104
 Even up until the 1920s, Belgian colonial beliefs and 
practices sought to inscribe the position of the Congolese man as the patriarchal head of 
the family, able to join the administration, the military, and the commercial firms. The 
Congolese woman however, was prepared for the home and lower level ‘feminized’ 
occupations. Colonial efforts to domesticize Congolese women took the form of foyer 
social (social homes), which were operated by European nuns and social workers. 
According to Congo scholar Nancy Rose Hunt, social homes were Belgian domestic 
training institutions for Congolese women living in colonial urban centers. Some women 
learned to cook, mend, iron, and wash clothes, and a select few were being trained to 
work (for pay) as auxiliary aids or monitors in the classroom”105:  
Colonial commentators thought women in the cities were “floundering, 
disoriented, vulnerable, and corruptible due to idleness, excessive leisure, 
and a void of custom”. Domesticity was to solution to institute her role as 
the "base of evolution." She was to represent and radiate moral standards 
and behavior for men and children, through the "civilized" institution of 
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the nuclear family. This logic was encapsulated in the aphorism: "To 
instruct a boy is ... to form a man; to instruct a girl is to form a family.
106
 
On the eve of independence, Congolese women were employed mainly as 
Catholic sisters and as mission elementary school teachers.
107
 Much of contemporary 
Congolese law is based on Belgian colonial laws, and the colonial state produced 
masculinities which originated from European beliefs and intersected with Congo’s 
existing gender norms.  For example rape is considered a crime against the honor of the 
husband and Congolese dowry systems legitimated the rape of women as a form of ‘gift-
giving’.108 A male could follow a woman going to collect firewood or gather crops and 
rape her and the issue would then be resolved between the two families by arranging a 
marriage with the man paying a price for the woman, or the man restoring the family’s 
honor by giving a goat.
109
 In the Congo, women traditionally were the major producers of 
food, especially in the non-Muslim areas of the West and the South. Their position as 
guarantors of agricultural and food security for the family contributed to their 
vulnerabilities to sexual violence during trips to the fields or the forest. The Belgian 
patriarchal aim (accomplished through Jesuits who were agricultural educators) to move 
women out of the fields and give men the necessary seeds, training, and supervision in 
farming
110
, compounded women’s vulnerabilities to violence. 
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Additionally, Belgian colonial practices involved educating a class of privileged 
‘évolué’ Congolese. The Belgian term évolué was loosely applied to those who had been 
educated by and were salaried workers of Europeans. Évolué’s were elite who had to 
fulfil moral, familial, professional, and civic duties, while serving as a model for less 
privileged Africans.111 This introduced class differentiation to the colonial masculinities 
and femininities superimposed onto Congolese social life. For example in the Katanga 
province in the southeast of Congo, the Belgian mining company Union Minière du Haut-
Katanga (UMHK) played a key role in the physical and social transformation of 
agricultural Katanga into a site for factories, mission stations and schools. During the 
1940s and 1950s,
112
 masculinity for Katangese men in the colonial wage labor economy 
was defined as the achievement of wealth and Western modernity. Katangese men 
considered their job as a way to achieve higher social status, to gain power, prestige and 
respectability, to accumulate wealth and to obtain access to Western consumer goods.
113
 
In this way, Belgian gender beliefs and practices stratified masculinities among men, and 
structured differential access to wealth and Western modernity among different classes of 
men. 
Therefore, state-produced gendered beliefs and discourses have produced laws 
which impacted the access Congolese men and women had to the state. Through this 
process the state became masculinized. 
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In her recent work Gender and Decolonization in Congo, Karen Bouwer shows 
that Congo’s first statesman and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba attempted to challenge 
the patriarchal legacy of Belgian colonial rule but ultimately failed to de-masculinize the 
state. This was because his own personal beliefs were fraught with contradictions, even 
though in a great deal of his speeches he urged the newly independent Congo to 
reconfigure and recreate new ideals of masculinity and femininity.  
Masculine and feminine identities in the decolonization era were still constituted 
by Belgian colonial discourses which had become reified as “traditional” or 
“customary”.114 Congo at the moment of decolonization was still contending with 
paternal forms of patriarchal power, kinship relations and chiefdom rule.
115
 However, the 
language and concept of ‘evolution’ produced through the Belgian évolué class and 
through the discourse of women as the ‘base of evolution’ for the family, remained 
embedded in the ways Lumumba spoke about Congolese women. In February 1960 in 
Brussels, Lumumba stated that the “evolution” of Congolese women had been neglected 
under the colonial regime. He invited the young women of Belgium to come to the Congo 
as welfare workers to educate “our Congolese girls” and that in the future the country 
would want to send many Congolese girls to Belgium in order to further their 
education.
116
  
Lumumba’s own writings from 1951 to 1956 (such as ‘Le Congo’) also show that 
he critiqued the old way of arranged marriages, a system which kept women uneducated, 
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and the custom of bride wealth which allowed parents to remove their daughters out of 
school and use them “as material assets” in order to obtain dowries.117 Simultaneously 
however, Lumumba also expected women to detach themselves from the “bad influence” 
of uncles and recognize the husband as the rightful head of the nuclear household.
118
 This 
thus reified the Belgian Christian patriarchal model. Lumumba argued that women should 
seek education in order to become “évolueés”119 in order to increase their chances of 
marry évolué husbands.
120
   
“We want progressively to make of the black girl an evolved civilized 
woman, equal to man so that our evolution of men and of women goes 
hand in hand to eliminate the gaps and inequalities that unfortunately 
separate us from our spouses, gaps and inequalities resulting strictly from 
their lack of schooling and education that we had the advantage of 
receiving at their expense. (Mutamba Maokmbo, Patrice Lumumba 134)”  
The Congolese woman was to be educated in order to achieve “evolution” toward 
“civilization” and not hold her husband back or fracture the family and  by implication, 
society.
121
  Moreover the dominant language of Lumumba’s discourse was (despite his 
partly progressive views on women’s education) the language of male fraternity. He 
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repeatedly called on his “frères” (brothers) to rise to the challenge of building a united 
and viable Congo.
122
 
The tension that existed in Lumumba’s statements in favor of the equality of men 
and women in employment and his simultaneous emphasis on the évolué household
123
 is 
mirrored in the contemporary status of Congolese women who act as civil servants, 
politicians and activist, but are still overwhelmingly discriminated against. 
In contemporary times, DRC’s military produces particular beliefs about gender 
and acts on those beliefs. Several pieces of scholarship have been produced by Maria 
Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern on the gender discourses of the Congolese National 
Army. In their work “Whores, Men and other Misfits: Undoing ‘Feminization’ in the 
Armed Forces in the DRC” Baaz and Stern show that the Congolese army constructs 
militarized masculinities124 and attempts to de-normalize the increasing number of women 
in the army.125  
Their research shows that the dominant belief concerning femininity (held by both 
genders and by older and younger generations) is that women are stupid, weak and 
subordinate to men. Additionally they do not require or deserve special protection from 
men.126 This image is reinforced by many popular sayings and radio songs.
127
 More 
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importantly, the soldiers employ four main discursive strategies in order ‘undo’ the threat 
of women’s bodies in the army and maintain militarized masculinity:  
Through (1) Deferral through evolutionary spatio-temporality; (2) 
claiming the zone of combat as masculine and women as weak and 
incapable; (3) employing the image of woman as unreliable whore; and (4) 
denying women’s femininity.128  
Regarding the first discursive strategy, the idea of the ‘evolution’ of women 
seems to be the uninterrupted inheritance of Belgian colonial discourse and Lumumba’s 
own proclamations of Congolese women not being as ‘evolved’ as Western women. 
FARDC soldiers insisted that Congolese women were not as superior to Western women 
soldiers:  
“Our African women have not yet reached the same stage as you 
(white/European women) and hence they cannot perform all tasks within 
the army…yet.”129  
The third discursive strategy of women as ‘unreliable whores’ was rife with 
contradiction because while women tended to be critical of the idea that there were 
special jobs for men and women in the army, some agreed with the notion that the sexual 
pollution of the ‘whore’ was useful for intelligence work.130 This is an example of how 
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state institutions have built into them presumptions about gender identities which shape 
their missions and the perception of who is sufficiently competent for a task.  
The belief in the unreliability of femininity also seems to be a colonial inheritance 
because Congolese soldiers employ narratives often featured in Biblical symbols such as 
Eve and Delilah, symbolizing the ‘unreliable vindictive temptresses who could signify 
the ruin of a man, and a whole battalion at war’.131 
Broadly speaking, in Congo gender discourses which contain contradictory 
symbols and tensions also extend to the identity politics. For example in “Sons of Which 
Soil?" The Language and Politics of Autochthony in Eastern D.R. Congo”, Stephen 
Jackson argues the position of autochthonous exclusion and belonging is constituted by 
gender discourses that contain frame Rwandese/Rwandophone men as decadent men who 
defile women and the family (constructed as the authentic Congolese body politic). This 
image exists alongside the contradictory image of a weak feminized 
Rwandese/Rwandophone man.
132
 Portraying ‘the enemy’ in war as both weak, feminized 
and as a dangerous threat is a contradictory gender discursive strategy which occurs 
simultaneously.  
Gender discourses of masculinity for the soldiers reveal that ‘manhood’ was 
closely linked to money, urbanity and material wealth. This may be a product of the 
colonial legacy of the privileged èvoluè class to which lower-class Congolese men aspire. 
It nonetheless points to one of the logics underlying the army’s theft and illegal taxation 
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of the civilian population. The soldiers’ testimonies conveyed a deep sense of 
disappointment and frustration over their failure to fulfil this ideal
133
. 
“That is also what is unfair…They give the women all the good jobs. They 
are the ones who get training. They are the ones who get jobs as 
secretaries, who get to learn typing. If you look at the administrative jobs 
– it is only women! It is not fair. If they want equality, they should get 
equality. (Male corporal, 23 years)” 
Here again the tension that existed in Lumumba’s statements in favor of the 
equality of men and women in employment and his retrogressive beliefs about women in 
the domestic sphere are reflected through the frustration of the soldier who recognizes 
women’s (albeit new) professional positions and finds it at odds with the prevailing 
dominant beliefs about the proper of role of women in society. 
The FARDC soldiers also cite poverty and poor living conditions as a barrier that 
prevents them from fulfilling their role as the ‘head of the household’. Currently, soldiers 
are among the poorest section of Congolese society.
134
 Comments such as “my wife does 
not love me anymore” revealed as sense of suspicion and frustration of not being able to 
fulfil the patriarchal role and ‘keep the woman faithful’.135  Similar to colonial 
commentators who thought women in the cities were “floundering, disoriented, 
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vulnerable, and corruptible”136, the FARDC discourses were portrayed women as 
unreliable and opportunistic:  
“If a woman sees that other better opportunities present themselves, she 
will ‘leave you, cheat on you or, if she is a fellow soldier, betray you to the 
enemy.”137  
These discourses that upheld women’s inferiority and militarized masculinity 
were shared by both male and female soldiers in the FARDC, even alongside 
contradictory discourses which affirmed women’s equality with male soldiers.138 
Lastly, discourses of masculinity and femininity in the FARDC were not simply 
‘local’, but were also globalized. Western films, Hollywood war movies and American 
soldiers contributed to the construction militarized masculinity and the denigration of 
women soldiers. However Congolese soldiers considered themselves stronger: “we are 
stronger than them [the American soldiers]. We do the same things, the same tough 
training. Everything they do, we do that too, but while they live and eat well, we do it on 
an empty stomach.”139 
State Practices  
“When you enter the center for military training… [you must] learn the 
tough spirit of a soldier…beating up is required…Those who are not able 
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to make it, we call them the ‘inept’, also sometimes ‘women’ […]- Male 
corporal in the Congolese Armed Forces.
140
 
In Congo, gender discourses constitute a socialized soldier identity which is based 
on the denigration of femininity. This explains why rape is committed by soldiers against 
many women, because this gender norm permits them to rationalize and normalize their 
actions. Belgian colonial gender discourses also masculinized government functions in 
the DRC and give men more access to the state than women. The discourses of ‘under-
evolved’ Congolese women not needing protection, of militarized masculinity and the 
failure to reach ideal masculinity, as well the hierarchical class-differentiated structures 
among men in the army and in Congolese society at large, account for the widespread 
instances of looting, illegal taxation, stealing and violence committed by Congolese 
soldiers. 
The first dysfunctional practice of the Congolese army is economic exploitation. 
The Congolese army is organized along patrilineal and patriarchal ‘Big Man’ networks141 
and Congolese commanders are able to abuse, control or protect their subordinates. The 
denigration of the feminine maintains the exclusivity of the system of male patronage 
because women soldiers’ are seen as unreliable, unfeminine or whorish. Much like class 
differentiation among évolué, the privileged position of senior offices produces 
dissatisfaction and frustration among the soldiers who are situated within patronage links 
that privilege their superiors and allow them to have access to the Western world: 
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There are no bad soldiers. It is our leaders ⁄ superiors who are bad. They 
don’t care about us. We don’t get anything, no food, no training… instead 
they send their children to school in Europe.
142
  
Despite that hierarchies of patronage within the army, the militarized masculine 
identity of FARDC remains empowered over civilians ones, and is encapsulated in the 
expression “civil azali bilanga ya militaire” - ‘the civilian is the [corn] field of the 
military’. Since the attainment of wealth is the biggest affirmer of the ideal masculinity, 
soldiers use this norm as a ground for justifying their economic exploitation of civilians. 
Soldiers ‘look for money to give to their wife’ in order to fulfil the the ‘head of the 
household’ role.143 Poverty prevents the fulfilment of this idealized masculinity and 
incites frustration as well as the urge to harm and destroy.
144
 Nevertheless as Baaz and 
Stern state, this does not lead to unrestrained violence because collaboration with 
civilians through petty trade yields greater profits because trust is necessary for doing 
business in the DRC.145 
The second practice enacted by the Congolese state armed forces in the ongoing 
civil war, is rape and sexual violence. The FARDC is responsible for a large portion of 
the sexual violence committed by armed men
146
 - about 40% of the sexual violence was 
committed by FARDC members in 2007 during the Kivu conflict. When soldiers rape, 
they employ patriarchal beliefs in masculinity and misogynistic beliefs in femininity to 
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normalize and rationalize it. Their empowerment as militarized men and the sense failure 
to realize idealized manhood creates the incentive to rape. Based on interviews conducted 
by Baaz and Stern in Kinshasa between September 2005 and 2008, the study “Why Do 
Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo”, 
shows that the way soldiers that soldiers speak about and normalize mass rape is by 
categorizing the rapes into “lust rapes” and “evil rapes’. Lust rapes are the inevitable 
results of the demands of male heterosexuality, and ‘evil rapes’ are the results of failed 
masculinities in the context of poverty, frustration and the ‘craziness of war’: 
The heterosexuality of the soldier
147
  and the belief in the male need for sexual 
fulfilment with women who were ‘like flowers’ during a “battle that is like a desert”148 
was a gender norm, belief and discourse used to normalize and rationalize rape. 
Secondly, a the failure of achieving idealized manhood because of poverty meant that 
rape, as colonel explained, “[was] a problem of the organization of society, if there was 
no poverty and suffering, and a solder could relieve his sexual needs the ‘normal’ way” 
149
. This view was also held by women soldiers in the army. Evil rapes were also due to 
poverty and the ‘craziness of war’, which produced the frustration and urge to destroy 
that caused soldiers to rape as an act of “sully[ing] the dignity of a people”.150  
Thus the military of the Congolese state employs particular norms of masculinity 
and femininity as a form of legitimation for sexual violence and abuse against civilians. 
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The gender discourses and beliefs which created militarized masculinities, subordinate 
femininities and a masculinized state produce the conditions for these state actions. We 
must look to gender as a causal factor for the widespread abuses against civilians by the 
FARDC. 
Gendered Human Insecurity 
Dysfunctional state practices perpetrated against the population undermines 
human security during civil war and causes the state to lose its legitimacy. The reality of 
militarization, of the empowerment of hegemonic militarized masculinity over civilian 
ones, and the gender beliefs in female inferiority is manifested in everyday life. 
Congolese men and women may seek industries (illicit mining) or join rebel groups in 
search of an escape from their subordination to militarized masculinities. But they also 
organize non-violently, as many Congolese women activists have done.
151
 
The military have very little legitimacy in the eyes of the DRC civilian 
population, who refer to them as thieves.
152
 The prevalence of rape for example, also 
means that Congolese women (who represent 80 percent of the agricultural workforce) 
are under the constant threat of rape and are forced to stay out of the fields, thereby 
jeopardizing the food supply for entire communities.
153
 A study done a group of UK-
based NGOs shows that some girls have willing joined rebel militias, while most have 
been abducted especially from the interior of Maniema, North Katanga and North and 
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South Kivu Provinces. Up to 30% to 40% of children in Congo’s rebel militias are 
girls.
154
 According to the report, girls view armed groups or military officials as the best 
opportunity to access food and material goods, as ‘a militarized life seems to be the only 
option of value.’155  The study also found that the great majority of girls served multiple 
roles at the same time. They are often ‘taken’ or ‘allocated’ as the sexual partner of a 
particular member of the armed group but also serve as escorts or fight in active conflict. 
Thus not only are hostilities between the military and civilian population increased 
through the impact of the civil war and the dysfunctional practices of states. 
Katrien Pype’s work (2007) “Fighting Boys, Strong Men and Gorillas: Notes on 
the Imagination of Masculinities in Kinshasa” argues that there are models of masculinity 
in Kinshasa (the Pasteur, the soldier, the yankee, the sapeur, the staffeur, the musician, 
the fighter) which exist simultaneously, but the ‘fighter’ identity is dominant.156 The 
‘fighter’ is the image of the soldier, who is able to secure territory and patronage like that 
of a ‘big man’.157 The fighting boys use their muscles to protect themselves against 
soldiers who attack them when they have no money, phones or other commodities to 
hand over.
158
 Young fighters take the soldier (“soda”) as an important model which they 
try to embody to become ‘real men’, although soldiers have inscribed themselves in acts 
                                                 
154
 Beth Verhey, "Reaching The Girls: Study on Girls Associated With Armed Forces and Groups in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo," (unpublished report, 2004) Save the Children UK and the NGO Group: 
CARE, IFESH and IRC, 6. 
155
 Ibid., 10. 
156
 Katrien Pype, "Fighting boys, strong men and gorillas: notes on the imagination of masculinities in 
Kinshasa." Africa: International African Institute 77, no. 2 (2007): 251  
157
 Ibid., 258. 
158
 Ibid., 256. 
44 
 
of violence from above.
159
 Even some songs sung to encourage the fighters are stolen 
from soldiers’ practices: “nalela nalela Matusa, butu na moyi tobetana masasi” [I love I 
love Matusa, day and night, we can always fire bullets]. “The soldier is one of the models 
that these young fighters select for ‘becoming a man’. The conception of ‘a real man’ 
reflects a process of militarization because they link their soldier masculinities to 
strength, courage and heroism. Some of the idealized forms of manhood expressed by 
FARDC soldiers are echoed by the fighting boys in the townships of Kinshasa: the 
physically muscled man, the wealthy man and the spiritual strong man are ideal types.  
Civilian men are aware of their disempowerment vis a vis hegemonic militarized 
masculinity in eastern provinces like Katanga where much of the illicit mining of gold, 
coltan and diamonds take finances rebel groups. In the mines of Katana, male artisanal 
miners also seek new ways out of their subordination to hegemonic militarized 
masculinity.  
This phenomenon is discussed in Jeroen Cuvelier’s work: “Men, Mines and 
Masculinities : the Lives and Practices of Artisanal Miners in Lwambo (Katanga 
Province, DR Congo).” Artisanal miners often receive very little for the minerals they 
extract and face systemic exploitation at the hands of political figures, armed groups. 
large-scale mining companies, the state-owned Gécamines, and the FARDC.
160
 
Cuvelier argues “that large groups of Katangese men have engaged in artisanal mining 
because they are eager to redefine the relationship between work and masculinity. They 
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also use their stay in the mining areas to construct new masculine identities based on 
wealth, strength and technical expertise. They are disempowered vis a vis militarized 
masculinities but also have to negotiate “the colonial male breadwinner norm (baba ni 
kazi: father is work)”. Among Katangese men, we see the reassertion of the metaphor of 
‘eating’ as the masculinized norm that legitimizes ‘father-chief’s state. As Cuvelier 
writes:  
Money is an important marker of masculine status in present-day Katanga. 
A man with a good job and plenty of cash to spend on drinks and clothes is 
treated with a lot of respect (heshima). He is usually addressed as 'patron' 
or 'boss' and he is described as a winner…who is getting a fat belly 
because he can always eat his fill …Katangese men consider themselves 
as 'plain-clothes soldiers' (militaires civiles) who fight for their right to 
exploit minerals and make easy money (l'argent facile / makuta ya dare 
dare).”161 
Confirming Katrien Pype’s observations about the existence of different 
masculinities in Kinsasha, Cuvelier notes that a miner with a lot of money is expected to 
be a grand sapeur and wear nice clothes, or behave like a wrestler and ‘fight with open 
hands’.162 However, much like the misogynistic beliefs of Congolese national army, men 
see women in Katanga Province as unreliable, as polluting and as thieves. The prostitutes 
in the mining industry are likened to ‘bats whose only aim is to flutter around at night and 
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bamboozle money’ out of men.163 Similar to female soldiers in the FARDC, civilian 
women share in these sexist beliefs. The nicknames like 'little chief' and 'sister living by 
herself' are used to criticize the independent and bossy nature of the prostitutes working 
around the mines.164 This shows that the legacy of colonial and postcolonial gender 
beliefs remains in Congo.  
Chapter Four: Sierra Leone 
History of Conflict in Sierra Leone 
The civil war began in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel 
groups sought to overthrow the All People’s Congress regime of President Joseph 
Momoh.
165
 During the war, 50% of the population was displaced, many women were 
brutally raped and both government and rebel forces carried out amputations of people’s 
arms and legs.
166
 Up until that point Sierra Leonean leaders - democratically elected Sir 
Milton Margai of the Sierra Leonean People’s party (SLPP) and later, Siaka Stevens of 
the All People’s Congress (APC), had instituted authoritarian and patron-client regimes 
to stay in power. Therefore from 1961 until the early 1970s, this form of rule undermined 
Sierra Leonean state. The looting of state resources by the political elite, coupled with 
structural adjustment policies of the 1980s-1990s and the oil crisis of 1973 led to 
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economic and political collapse in the country.
167
 In 1985 Siaka Stevens handed control 
of the government to his handpicked successor, the commander Joseph Momoh,
168
 who 
tried to launch progressive measures, but ultimately failed to forestall further state decline 
brought about by a coup by the National Provisional Revolutionary Council (NPRC) 
1992 and a counter coup by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in 1997.  
In 1996, democratic elections were attempted, in which Ahmad Kabbah of the 
Sierra Leonean People’s Party (SLPP) was elected president. A ceasefire was signed 
between the government and the RUF through the Lomé Peace Accord in 1999. 
However, this agreement broke down and the RUF attacked Freetown, capturing it and 
gaining control over other parts of the country. An intervention by the Economic 
Community of West African States Monitory Group (ECOMOG), led by Nigeria, helped 
President Kabbah and his government regain control of Freetown.
169
 After the SLPP 
government was restored in 1998, the U.N. peacekeeping forces (UNAMISL) were 
deployed to help the national government consolidate power hold elections in 2002.
170
 
Foday Sankoh, a trainee of Charles Taylor during the Liberian civil war, led the 
RUF. The RUF abducted a high number of boy and girl child soldiers and trained youth 
laborers from the diamond mining industry in guerrilla fighting tactics. The Sierra 
Leonean national army was ill-equipped and often fought by copying the recruitment and 
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guerrilla tactics of the RUF. After the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) took 
power in 1992, it continued to wage war against the RUF by creating a paramilitary - the 
Civil Defense Forces (CDF) – who were also known as kamajors.171 However, both the 
national army and the CDF forces increased the insecurity of the population by 
intermingling with the RUF and other splinter rebel groups which emerged.  
Colonial, Post-Colonial and Contemporary Gender Discourses in Sierra 
Leone 
For centuries Sierra Leone had engaged in the slave trade with Europeans who 
arrived on its coast – the Portuguese, Dutch, French and English. In 1787 the anti-slavery 
movement led Britain to abolish slavery, and the London-based Sierra Leone Company 
repatriated emancipated slaves from London to Sierra Leone to the settlement of 
Freetown (named “the Province of Freedom”). In 1790s, more freed slaves arrived from 
North America, Nova Scotia and Jamaica. Also during that century, Mande Muslims 
traders, missionaries and warrior migrated to Sierra Leone. In the 19
th
C century, the 
British navy continued to rescue slaves from slave ships crossing the Atlantic from West 
and Central Africa and sent them to Freetown. These groups formed the Krio ethnic 
group, a group with a distinct language and culture which kept its ties to England. The 
dominant indigenous ethnicities in Sierra Leone however, were the Mende, the Temne, 
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the Limba and the Sherbro. In 1896 the British declared a protectorate over the hinterland 
of the colony, formalizing its colonization of the Freetown and the Protectorate.
172
  
The Krio worked in the import-export trade and were educated in schools founded 
by missionary societies.
173
 Freetown was separated from the surrounding rural villages by 
British administrators and local discontent in rural areas was suppressed through “Native 
Administrations” created in 1896 by the British appointment of a set of “Paramount 
Chiefs” as the sole local government authority. Paramount Chiefs were responsible for 
the arbitration of land and legal disputes, for the collection of tax revenue and the general 
welfare of their people.
174
 
When the colonial government extended its reach to the Sierra Leonean 
hinterland, it was to establish trade, to strengthen the existing system of chiefdom and to 
abolish slavery and polygyny. Although their missionary schools also sought to 
reconstitute gender norms and beliefs, unlike the Belgians in Congo, the British did not 
implement aggressive policies.   
Christian missionaries were the first to establish Western schools in the south of 
Sierra Leone because the Muslim influences in the North kept Christian missionary work 
at bay. By the 1890s two English denominations were working among the Mende - The 
United Free Methodists were located in Bo, and the Wesleyan Methodists were in 
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Mafwe. The active church group in the whole Protectorate however, was the American 
United Brethren in Christ (UBC).
175
 
Sierra Leone, due to its history, had a fundamental division between Freetown 
(the Colony) and the rest of the country (the Protectorate). Thus the position of Krio 
women in the Protectorate differed from those of Mende and Temne women according to 
class, ethnicity and culture. Krio women were educated according to Victorian values in 
British schools, but Temne and Mende women in rural southern Sierra Leone still 
maintained traditional social institutions such as chieftaincy and “secret” initiation 
societies. As contact between the Protectorate and Freetown increased however, elite 
Krio women sought participation in initiation societies like the Bundu. This was heavily 
resisted by Christian missionaries and Colony men, even as Bundu began to spread. In 
her work “Women, Work and Ethnicity: The Sierra Leonean Case”, Francis White 
documents this phenomenon:  
In February 1887, Henry Willock accused Sarah Williams of beating a 
Bundu drum all night without a license…she was found guilty and 
sentenced to jail with one week of hard labor…The growth of women’s 
secret society Bundu in the Colony demonstrates the appeal of local 
culture to the immigrant Africans. In Bundu, these uprooted women found 
solidarity among themselves [and] membership in Bundu helped provide a 
basis for authority [and survival].
176
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Since religious conversion proved to be difficult, colonial officials and 
missionaries in Sierra Leone realized that religious proselytizing had to be accompanied 
with formal education in order to affect the social and political organizations of the 
Mende. A colonial Governor of Sierra Leone from 1904 to 1911 – Leslie Probyn – 
described this problem:  
"[Africans] are a very cautious race, and they will not accept new ideas 
merely because they are presented to him by a white man... missionary 
work does not simply consist in distributing Bibles."
177
 
Conversion to Christianity was best achieved when Western education, healthcare 
and other forms of training accompanied.
178
 According to Francis White, the expansion 
of colonial administration in the interior was achieved through diplomatic missions, 
friendship treaties with chiefs, commerce and coercion. Additionally, White argues that 
although this approach converted indigenous Sierra to Christianity, many still kept 
ancestral beliefs or remained Muslim.
179
 Probyn remarked: 
“An experience of several years both here and at Sierra Leone has 
convinced me that European Governments, by their present methods, are 
helpless to confer any permanent benefits upon the people of Africa.”180 
Nonetheless British colonists expanded into the interior because they reasoned 
that this would serve the colony’s Christian ethical and commercial purposes.181 Thus 
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rural Sierra Leoneans were the targets the earliest education experiments in West 
Africa.
182
 Education was limited to what the colonial authorities termed the 'ruling class' 
– sons of Paramount Chiefs established under the Native Administration.183 
For colonial officials, male children of chiefs needed ‘civilizing’ knowledge in 
order to be rescued from the barbarism of their parents: 
“Children [were] separated from the vicious customs and practices of their 
parents [and] were placed under the entire control and care of the 
missionaries and teachers…thus preserved from the contaminating 
example of their heathen countrymen.”184 
Governor Probyn appointed Reverend James Proudfoot, a former missionary in 
the West Indies and the Bo area to be the first principal at a school in Bo.
185
 By favouring 
the education of boys, the British helped entrenched patriarchal norms within Mende 
social institutions and promote the masculinization of political power. 
Prior to this female Paramount chiefs and were considered to be legitimate leaders 
within the chieftaincy institution. Although Mende political socio-institutions had a 
patrilineal bias, they were far less patriarchal than those of Victorian England.  
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Female chieftaincy among Mende Sierra Leoneans derives from the pre-colonial 
social institutions
186
 of Poro and the Sande initiation societies. The function of these 
societies has been to initiate children into adulthood by assigning boys and girls ritual 
activities which serve to affirm their masculine or feminine gender identity.
187
 The Poro 
society has also been the primary arbiter of civil and political relations among the Mende 
and the key institution supporting both male and female chieftaincy.
188
 Sande initiation 
societies had promoted women as political and military leaders,
189
 and Poro initiation 
societies had allowed for the existence of non-patriarchal forms of gender identity, such 
as the female official of Poro (mabɔle) – who carries a bi-gender identity.190  
Additionally, the privileging of male education by British colonialists for the 
purposes of political rule went against the long-standing political leadership of Mende 
and Sherbro women. In 1787, it was a Sherbro woman named Queen Yamacouba who 
was the signatory to the treaty which ceded territory to the British Crown.
191
 Another 
woman chief, Madam Yoko of the Kaiyamba Chiefdom wielded much political power 
and later became a member of the Sierra Leone Peoples' Party.
192
 Temne market women 
in Freetown also wielded financial power due to their involvement in the colonial 
agricultural trade.  
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Thus British policy, education and missionization masculinized the chieftaincy 
institution and established it as an arm of the colonial administration. Mariane Ferme’s 
seminal ethnography The Underneath of Things,  shows that chieftaincy in Sierra Leone 
is defined by a masculinized and clienteslistic order, in which “everyone [must be] linked 
in a relationship of patronage or clientship”193 to a “big person” (kpako). Kpako chiefs 
were entitled to power because of their age, seniority and masculinity. A male kpako is 
entitled to several wives and several children, but a female kpako (kpako nyaha) is 
considered non-normative because she is free from domestic ties and has no husband or 
male patron.  
Colonial education competed alongside indigenous ways of child maturation. 
While, Christian missionaries taught bouts to focus of agriculture and trade, and girls on 
handwork and homemaking, Mende people reinterpreted those beliefs to fit Poro and 
Sande, refusing to accept them wholesale.
194
 While children were urged to renounce the 
‘heathen’ practices of polygamy and worshipping false gods,195 Mende children 
interpreted their education as part of the spiritual structures of Poro and Sande which 
linked them to patrons, kin, ancestors and sprits,
196
 and to God (Ngewo) who would 
bestow blessings to those who had done good deed for their patrons.
197
  
In the decolonization era, Sierra Leoneans challenged the masculinized and 
clientelistic state institutions created by colonialism. Ismail Rashid notes that ‘between 
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1955 and 1956, peasants in the northern region of Sierra Leone launched an insurrection 
against the Paramount Chiefs, illustrating the inadequacy of traditional’ and 
‘paternalistic’ forms of governance that had been the linchpin of British colonialism.198 
Secondly, women in the Colony and in the Protectorate also organized against the 
masculinized and clientelistic institutions of the state. In 1938, Constance Cummings-
John became the first woman to be elected mayor of the municipality of Freetown and 
Mabel Dove became the first West African woman to be elected to the legislative 
council.
199
 The West African Youth League (WAYL) was a nationalist movement 
established by I. T. A. Wallace Johnson in 1935 which sought to articulate new models of 
governance, and of masculinity and femininity. Wallace Johnson for example, reformed a 
Biblical narrative in order to counter sexist beliefs: 
 “God did not take women from man’s crown because he did not want her 
to rule; he did not take her from his foot because he did not want her to be 
a slave; and so he took her from his side, because he wanted her to be 
equal.”200  
The WAYL elected five women—Lorine W. Miller, Lottie Black, Cummings- John, 
Elliott- Horton and Gladys Tyre—into its first central committee. Despite these measures 
and proclamations in favor of gender equality, the WAYL still presented the nationalist 
struggle in overwhelming masculinist terms. The National Council’s central committee, 
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was still ‘anchored on the philosophy of male political superiority’, according to LaRay 
Denzer, and was therefore Cummings-John and Etta Harris running as candidates in the 
SLPP.
201
 
Thus the Sierra Leonean Women’s movement (SLWM) emerged to challenge the 
masculinized nationalist project of decolonization. The movement united Krio women in 
Freetown and Mende women of the Protectorate in 1951 in an effort to ‘1) improve the 
status of all Sierra Leonean women, whether born in the Colony or in the Protectorate and 
2) seek female representation in government’.202 The movement established adult literacy 
classes, a scholarship fund for girls and other social programs for the mass of women.
203
  
The two dominant political parties from 1948 to 1957– the Sierra Leone People’s 
Party (SLPP) and the National Council of Sierra Leone (NC) - however, remained 
overwhelmingly masculinized. The two parties exploited colonial divisions and harbored 
resentment against one another.
204
 Neither parties enlisted women supports, nor did they 
have any women candidates. Later, the women’s movement allied itself with the SLPP, 
which it perceived to be more representative than the NC. At the time of the 1957 
election, the only woman in parliament was Madam Ella Koblo Gulama, a Paramount 
Mende chief elected to one of the twelve seats reserved for chiefs. She became Sierra 
Leone’s first woman Minister and advocated strongly for the education of women in the 
Protectorate. Still, few women were nominated as candidates for local or national 
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elections, and few received government positions. The women’s movement protested 
against the constitutional talks of 1960, which did nothing to reform marriage and 
property laws that discriminated against women.
205
 The constitution did not enable 
women to challenge Sierra Leone’s legal system of statutory, customary and religious 
laws.
206
 In 1975, the Marxist women’s movement - the National Congress of Sierra 
Leone Women (NCSLW) - was formed by Nancy Steele to liberate Krio women from the 
British colonial system which had relegated them to domesticity, poor wages and 
inequality. But it too, was unable to prevent the increasingly masculinized state from 
excluding women from political power. Siaka Steven’s regime consolidated the 
masculinized paternal order by asserting as the symbol of the “Father of the Nation’”. His 
successor General Joseph Momoh continued this symbol by describing himself as: 
“The father of the nation…[in] a ship of state…at the helm”.207  
The image of the father-chief thus helped consolidate the paternal order in the 
decolonization period in Sierra Leone. Momoh claimed that the nation was a “family 
union” with a “family head”.208 ‘Father-chief’ masculinity was posited relationally with 
‘motherhood femininity’, relegating women to marginal political roles. For example, 
Siaka Stevens APC government controlled the purchasing and distribution of the 
country’s staple food, rice. “Empty bag nor dae tenap” was an axiom that meant “an 
empty bag cannot stand”, suggesting that a malnourished political opponent would not 
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have the stamina to fight and invoking the rights of the ‘father-chief to ‘eat well’. APC 
leadership gave control over the retailing of rice to its party women, who were given the 
patronizing nickname “Mammy Queen,” emphasizing their maternal, instead of political 
role.
209
 
Finally, in addition to this history of gender discourse and beliefs, contemporary 
globalized images of militarized masculinity became part of the context of gender 
discourses in which the Sierra Leonean civil war took place. David Keen shows that 
Rambo was a common icon among government soldiers as well as rebels.
210
 Paul 
Richards and Danny Hoffman make a similar observation, pointing to the fact that 
popular Western fictional television images circulating in Sierra Leone in the diamond 
fields of the south and east were used as a resource for framing their actions.
211
 Richards 
suggest that Rambo was an archetypal war fighter figure and resonated with Sierra 
Leonean government soldiers and RUF rebels because of his ability to outmaneuver 
corrupt governments. Hoffman shows that young combatants from the Civil Defense 
Forces, were invigorated by the cinematic exploits of figures such as Sylvester Stallone, 
Arnold Schwarzenegger and gangsta rapper Tupac Shakur – seeing similarities in their 
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ability to defeat assaults with the kamajor spiritual ability to repel bullets.
212
 Hoffman 
states:  
“As we sat dicussing the upcoming day’s disarmament proceeding in the local 
CDF office, Mohammed Barrie was describing what it took to be a “hard” 
fighter, a common descirptor of combatatns noted for their skill, ruthelessness 
and bravery…He pointed to a poster on the wall- Arnold Schwarzenegger in 
wrap-around sunglasses, draped in automatic weaponry…the world 
“commando” was printed vertically down the side.”213 
Hoffman argues that the ubiquity of “Rambo” as a figure of militarized masculine 
idetntiy was important for the construction of combatants on all sides. It also influenced 
youth organizations in Sierra Leone who took on the names of “Terminator” and “Delta 
Force” as organizational titles. Other masculinzed fighter images drew from Biblical 
narratives such as the story of Sampson, whose supherhuman strength and long hair 
inspired one CDF commander to grow dreadlocks
214
. According to one informant, to 
truly understand the kamajors, one needed to study Steven Spielberg’s movie which 
represented kamajor “strength, heriosm and fearless love for their country” as well as 
their quintessential model of a masculine Mende body.
215
 Thus the rank and file of both 
the RUF and the CDF shared masculine pleasure in being ‘rebels’. These discourses of 
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militarized masculinity were necessary for the performance of soldierism, emphasizing 
on the ‘hardness’ of the body and the use of drugs and alcohol.216  
State Practices 
Very quickly after the war started in 1991, junior officers of the national army, led 
by Valentine Strasser, staged a coup, overthrowing President Joseph Momoh and 
establishing the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). The NPRC first hastily 
trained lower class Sierra Leonean youth to fight the RUF. The result of this was a poorly 
disciplined, poorly trained and unprofessional army. Although Strasser was later replaced 
by Julius Madaa Bio as head of the junta government in 1996, it was clear that the army 
was not effectively fighting the rebels, and thus the new strategy of the government was 
to create a parallel military force
217
 – the ‘Kamajors’ and other ethnic militias who made 
up the Civil Defense Forces (CDF). The government, through a public announcement on 
national radio, called upon all citizens in the south and eastern provinces to take arms and 
combat the rebels.
218
 The Civil Defense Forces recruits were members of traditional 
hunting societies from the rural part of Sierra Leone,
219
 and they became known for their 
belief in magical protection and fighting tactics. Later, they were organized by the 
Defense Minister Hinga Norman of the SLPP government in 1996 into unified militia, 
and were trained and deployed in battlefield by private military contractors. 
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Two state practices are thus identified in the Sierra Leonean war – the creation of 
the paramilitary (Civil Defense Forces/kamajors) and ‘sobelism’ – army solderis who 
were “soldiers by day and rebels by night” raping and abusing civilians, and joining RUF 
rebels in order to loot from the diamond mines. The Sierra Leonean civil war shows that 
the actions of the state army were enabled by the gendered hierarchies of the 
masculinized state and were legitimated by those gender beliefs and norms which 
informed militarized masculinity and reinforced women’s subordination.  
There was a notable difference however, between the conduct of the CDF forces 
and the ‘sobels’ of national army. Although parts of southeast Sierra Leone were subject 
to attacks and occupations by the RUF, the greatest threat came from the sobels who 
impersonated the RUF.
220
 The CDF also committed abuses against civilian, but to a lesser 
extent. This difference may be accounted for by normative values held by the CDF
221
 
which they expressed in their war songs and battlefield chants: kamajor baa woteh (a 
kamajor does not turn back) was repeated as a way to express their commitment to 
protecting the community. Interviewed in 2002 in Bo, a CDF commanding officer 
claimed that kamajors were prohibited from looting villages and committing rape. He 
also went on to explain that targeting people’s business was prohibited because kamajors 
were the “true” state military222 responsible for protecting civilians.223 This principle was 
not shared by the national army soldiers.  
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Still overall, the CDF forces were concerned with issues of citizenship, adult 
manhood, and economic survival,
224
 and they employed these gendered norms to 
constructed militarized masculine identity and to rationalize and normalize their own 
abuses.  
Like the FARDC, militarized masculinity created systems of male patronage. In 
his article, “The Meaning of a Militia: Understanding the Civil Defense Forces in Sierra 
Leone”, Danny Hoffman cites a former kamajor, who put his relationship to the group in 
the explicitly patrimonial terms, drawing the familial connection between commanders 
and their dependents:  
‘The same way I give [orders] to my son, I can give them to [my 
fighters]
225
. 
 As a patron, a commander within the CDF would be responsible for his “clients” 
by providing food, shelter, weapons and ammunition. In return, a patron/commander’s 
dependents would be expected to be loyal to the “big man”, and share a portion of 
whatever wealth they might accumulate with him.
226
 As with the ‘Big Man’ networks in 
the FARDC, militarized masculinity in was hierarchically ordered within the CDF.  
 Kamajors were a mobilization of Poro (the male initiation society)
227
 and therefore 
instituted practices of patronage and initiation into manhood and masculinity.”228  
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Contemporary globalized military films also helped created the militarized 
identity of the kamajors. Kamajors claimed to possess the secret military tactics used by 
the Viet Cong used against American troops from films such as First Blood, Rambo, 
Commando, Delta Force and The Hard Way. Civil Defense Forces however, abducted 
boy and girl child soldiers. They used girl soldiers as fighters, porters, spies cooks and as 
‘wives’.229 Thus militarized kamajor masculinity was maintained constructed 
complementary subordinate femininities. 
Interestingly, the CDF viewed their abduction of child soldiers as form 
‘civilizing’ education. This may also be a continuity of colonial discourse. CDF 
coordinator Chief Sam Hinga Norman described the recruitment of male and female child 
soldiers as a ‘civilizing’ process: 
“A lot of these kinds witness the slaughter of their parents and 
were…living like beast in the bush. We had to catch them and bring them 
back into the fold as human beings.”230 
During the war, the government soldiers looted from the diamond mines and 
sometimes even offered to buy diamonds from the RUF in return for weapons.
231
 The 
soldiers’ drive to access financial profit in the form of diamonds points to the frustrationz 
of militarized masculinity, in which the reality of poverty in the soldier’s live did not 
concur with the promises of militarized power.  
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Gendered Human insecurity 
The loss of trust by the civilians in the government due to the abuses of the army 
and CDF were widespread,
232
 and as in the DRC, the gender discourses which enabled 
the state’s dysfunctional practices were widespread. This is evidenced by the gendered 
practices of the RUF and in the young boys who joined rebel groups as the countryside of 
the southeast became completely militarized.
233
 Young boys, aware of the dominance of 
militarized masculinity and the reward of economic profit, took up arms to join new rebel 
groups such as Armed Forces Revolutionary council. David Keen quotes an informant: 
“A lot drop out of school early and these do not have fair job 
opportunities and, having gone to [secondary] school, they do not want to 
go back to their villages and till the land. They feel they are a little too 
enlightened to go back and till the soil! They feel their friends will laugh 
at them, and say you’re still farming even though you went off to school. 
They saw that being a rebel you can loot at will, then you have a sway 
over your former master, who used to lord it over you, or the others who 
might have laughed. You might as well go to the bush and become a 
rebel.
234
 
The globalized images of militarized masculinity were also employed by the RUF 
forces. Young rebels took on names such as “Queen Chop Hands,” “Nasty Rambo ,” 
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“General Babykiller,” “Captain 2 Hands,” “Adama Cut Hands,” and “Commando Cut 
Hands” to show that violence was becoming part of their identity.235  
The RUF mirrored the gendered practices of the CDF, abducting girl and boy 
child soldiers and normalizing the practice through the rubric of an initiation society. 
Through initiation into the RUF, boys became men and girls become wives.
236
 The RUF 
organized girls and women into four categories: non-wives, unprotected wives, protected 
wives, and senior women. ‘Bush marriages’ conducted by the RUF through coercion, 
violence and rape. The women and girl soldiers describe this experience as “‘virgination’, 
as being ‘used’ as a woman/wife. Zoe Marks work "Sexual violence in Sierra Leone's 
civil war: ‘Virgination’, rape, and marriage" shows this process. As a female soldier – 
Mariatu – explained:  
“Thirty girls were captured from my school, aged between ten and 20 
years. One girl from my school, ten men used her. Five men used me that 
first day, virginated me. They used their weapons to threaten me. My legs 
swelled up and I only wanted to die. … They didn't use me again – I was 
very small.” 237 
Through this system, boy soldiers also reached male adulthood. A 13-year old RUF 
soldier describes: 
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“I didn't have a wife during the war. When I capture a lady when we 
attack the village we will stay there for some time. We run back to the 
camp when the kamajors or government attacks. … My boss, he would call 
me and say, ‘See how we do mommy and daddy business [sex].’ After one 
year I did it. My boss wouldn't let me take women back to camp. Only the 
older boys had women in camp.
” 238
 
From this we can surmise that the highly militarized and patriarchal structure of 
the RUF, and the secondary status of females within its ranks who made up 
approximately 30% of its combatants, were the result of the widespread and dominant 
gender beliefs and discourses which had militarized the state and the economy, and which 
had empowered militarized masculinities over civilian ones. 
Conclusion 
The case study of Sierra Leone and the DRC show that gender discourses are a 
cause of state practices in civil war, although they do not function in simplistic causal 
ways. 
This paper shows that gender discourses do not function in simplistic causal ways 
but rather, when civil wars take place, state militaries employ gender norms to rationalize 
and normalize the practice of raping and exploiting civilians, even when they contain 
contradictory logics. Second, gender discourses create the conditions and the basis of 
beliefs from which states commit these actions. They do this by masculinizing the sate, 
                                                 
238
 Ibid. 
67 
 
and circumscribing women’s access to the state. Finally, they create militarized 
masculinity, which enables soldiers to commit abuses. These are the ways in which 
gender discourses cause dysfunctional state practices in civil war – the hierarchies of 
power and the gendered norms that undergird the state’s institutions set the stage for 
soldiers to abuse men and women.  
These actions impact the civilian population in negative ways by perpetuating 
those gender beliefs and the hegemony of militarized masculinity, and by reinforcing the 
actions of rebel militias who act along similar gendered norms. When this is coupled with 
globalized a mining industry financing rebel groups, the result is the worsening of human 
insecurity during civil wars. 
However, this comparative study has also revealed some interesting difference. 
First, the form of colonial rule – direct versus indirect – accounts for the speed at which 
patriarchal norms and the masculinization of the state is consolidated. Since Mende 
beliefs in Sierra Leone were not as aggressively restructured as in Belgian Congo, it 
allowed space for the formation of a women’s movement which tried to challenge the 
paternal order. Female leadership was rooted the principles reflected by Mende notions of 
gender complementarity and female chiefdom
239
 whereas in the DRC fully articulated 
patriarchy and the stronger misogynistic beliefs (as well as the Belgian discourse of 
female devolution) entrenched the masculinization of the state at an earlier stage. The 
relative differences in the pre-war exclusion of women from political space may explain 
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how quickly the state became militarized and how quickly moved towards dysfunctional 
practices. 
Secondly, commitments by armies to certain norms may mitigate the drive to 
employ discourses of masculinity and femininity as way to justify rape and civilian 
exploitation. This is illustrated by the differences in conduct between the CDF and the 
‘sobels’ in Sierra Leone. The normative commitments of the CDF account for relatively 
lower levels of rape and sexual violence, whereas the rejection by FARDC soldiers of the 
need to protect women might account for the higher levels of sexual violence committed 
against women. This means that the ‘logic of masculinist protection’ is rife with 
contradiction because both the offering and withdrawal of masculinist protection 
exacerbates women’s insecurity and vulnerability. However, whenever sexual violence 
was committed against women, the brutality of the act itself remained comparable among 
both armies.  
Thirdly, the duration of the conflict is a significant factor that determined how 
entrenched militarized masculinities were over civilian masculinities. Due to the length of 
Congo’s war, civilian disempowerment vis a vis the army and the militarization of the 
economy has become institutionalized in everyday life. In the Sierra Leonean war, the 
state encouraged the formation of militarized masculinities and a militarized economy by 
calling on rural men to take up arms and fight the RUF rebels. However, this was a short-
69 
 
lived strategy and did not allow for the deepening of the ‘protectionist’ state security 
apparatus and those living under its rule.
240
 
Still, the two cases exhibited strong similarities. For example, while the norms of 
militarized masculinity may have been variable in their content among the two 
countries
241
, certain patterns of gender discourses were common to both. One was the 
paternal image of the government standing in the same relationship to its citizens the way 
that a father does to his children. This was the primary means by which women were 
denied political space and by which the state was masculinized. 
Another was the influence of globalized contemporary images in militarizing 
masculinities in the DRC and Sierra Leone. The visual manifestations can be seen in 
pictures of Congolese or Sierra Leonean rebels which Jane Parpart describes as ‘soldiers 
in guerrilla chic clothing, Ray-Ban sunglasses, brandishing their guns with bravado, and 
looking triumphantly into the cameras’.242 
Both militaries relied on essentialist claims about heterosexual desire to legitimize 
rape or the taking of ‘wives’. The masculinized structure of the military also meant that 
patronage systems were in place, which contributed to poverty, the failure to achieve 
idealized moneyed masculinity and the frustrations that incited them to harm others. 
Then, the widespread nature of these beliefs meant that civilians everywhere were 
aware of them, and aware of the dominance of militarized masculinity. Civilian men and 
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women, as well as rebel groups either mirrored the gendered practices of the state, or 
tried to find ways out. For example, notions of male heterosexuality bound up with 
Mende initiation practices led to the gendered division of labor within the RUF. Congo’s 
rebel groups displayed a similar institutionalization of the rape of young girls. 
This paper has shown that norms of masculine and feminine gender identity are 
products of colonial, post-colonial and contemporary discourses. They are used by the 
state to rationalize and legitimize the dysfunctional practices of raping and abusing 
civilians. Gendered hierarchies of power, norms and beliefs create the structural 
conditions for dysfunctional state practices through militarized masculinities, 
masculinized sates and disempowered femininities.  
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